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A Generic Metaheuristic Approach to Sequential Security Games

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AAMAS 2020

Problem definition

Sequential Security Games with Stackelberg Equilibrium Defender (D) commits strategy first, then Attacker (A) chooses strategy Goal: maximize Defender's payoff

$$BR(\pi^D) = \operatorname*{arg\,max}_{\pi^A \in \Pi^A} U^A(\pi^D, \pi^A)$$

 $\underset{\pi^{D}\in\Pi^{D}}{\arg\max}\,U^{A}(\pi^{D},BR(\pi^{D}))$

 π^{D}, π^{A} – Defender's/Attacker's strategy U^{D}, U^{A} - Defender's/Attacker's payoff

Motivation and contribution

Finding Stackelberg Equilibrium is a kind of optimization problem – evolutionary algorithms is one of the most promising optimization methods

Creating a **general** Stackelberg Games solution framework based on evolutionary algorithms, easily **adaptable to various types of games**

An anytime approximation method for time-critical applications

EASG Overview



Chromosome representation

Each chromosome represents Defender's mixed strategy – a set of pure strategies with their probabilities Initially chromosomes contain random pure strategies

$$CH_q = \{(\pi_1^q, p_1^q), \dots, (\pi_{l_q}^q, p_{l_q}^q)\}, \quad \sum_{i=1}^{l_q} p_{l_q}^q = 1$$

 π_i^q - pure strategy (e.g. list of Defender's actions in consecutive time steps) p_i^q - probability of strategy π_i^q

 l_q – length of chromosome CH_q (the number of pure strategies included in the mixed strategy represented by that chromosome)

Crossover

Crossover operation combines two chromosomes by merging their sets of pure strategies and halving their probabilities

After crossover each pure strategy (π_j^q) may be deleted with probability $1 - \frac{p_j^q}{2}$



Mutation

Mutation randomly changes one Defender's action in one of pure strategies starting from a randomly chosen time step Each chromosome is mutated with *mutation rate* probability Exploration of new areas of the search space



Selection

Fitness function - Defender's payoff in case of playing a mixed strategy encoded in the chromosome

Binary tournament - two chromosomes are randomly chosen and the one with a higher fitness value is promoted to the next generation with probability $p_s > 0.5$, otherwise the lower-fitted one is promoted

Some number of *elite* chromosomes (with the greatest fitness function value) → unconditionally promoted to the next generation population

Performance

Mean Defender's payoff increases in time - the entire population moves towards the areas with higher payoff

Low-payoff individuals exist in all generations - exploration of new strategies



Results quality

Games type	Fraction of games with optimal solution found	Mean difference between the optimal and EASG	The highest difference between the optimal and EASG
Warehouse Games	72%	0.0013	0.0127
Search Games	47%	0.0253	0.0955
FlipIt Games	73%	0.0087	0.0321
	2500 - 2500 - 2000 - 1500 - 1000 - 500 - 0 0.0 0.1 distance	0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 from the optimal solution	

Time scalability

Time performance strongly depends on selected steering parameters – the possibility of establishing the expected balance between computation time and quality of results

The highest time efficiency among the tested methods



Summary

Evolutionary algorithm which can be easily adapted to various types of Security Games

Efficient approximation method with high stability and good results quality

Capable of solving larger and more complex sequential Security Games than state-of-the-art methods

Iteration-based construction - well suited for time-critical applications (*anytime* method)