

# Evolutionary Approach to Security Games with Signaling



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

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# Problem definition

- Inspiration: prevent poaching in Africa
- 2 players: **Defender** and **Attacker**
- Defender's units: patrollers, drones
- Drone can send one of the following signals:
  - weak – sending information to patrollers about attack detection
  - strong – sending information about attack and launch sound/light signals to deter Attacker
- Games on graph – each vertex is target with set of payoffs
- Defender's strategy: assigning patrollers and drones to targets, signaling strategy
- Attacker's strategy: choose target to attack, signaling reaction
- Players' uncertainties considered



# Problem definition – Stackelberg equilibrium

- Defender commits strategy first
- Attacker, knowing the Defender's strategy, chooses his/her strategy
- Defender always commits to a mixed strategy
- **Stackelberg equilibrium:** pair of players' strategies, for which strategy change by any of players leads to his/her result deterioration.

$$(\pi_D^*, R(\pi_D^*)) \in \Pi_D \times \Pi_A$$

$$\pi_D^* = \operatorname{argmax}_{\pi_D \in \Pi_D} U_D(\pi_D, R(\pi_D))$$

$$R(\pi_D) = \operatorname{argmax}_{\pi_A \in \Pi_A} U_A(\pi_D, \pi_A)$$

$G \in \{D, A\}$  – players (Defender, Attacker)  
 $\Pi_G$  – a set of player's  $G$  all mixed strategies  
 $U_G$  – payoff of player  $G$

# Evolutionary algorithm (EASGS) - solutions encoding

$$CH_j = \{(e_1^j, q_1^j), \dots, (e_i^j, q_i^j), \dots, (e_{d_j}^j, q_{d_j}^j), \Psi_j^\theta, \Phi_j^\theta\}$$

$e_i^j = (V_p, V_s, V_r)$  - pure strategy

$V_p$  - a set of vertices with assigned patrollers

$V_s$  - a set of vertices with assigned drones

$V_r$  - reallocation plan, a set of vertices (connected with  $V_p$ ), to which each patroller moves if no adversaries are observed

$q_i^j$  - the probability of playing strategy  $e_i^j$

$\theta \in \{\bar{s}, s^+, s^-\}$  - drones allocation states:

$\bar{s}$  - no patroller is in the drone's neighbourhood

$s^+$  - a patroller is planned to visit drone's vertex in the reaction stage



$s^-$  - no patroller will visit drone's vertex in the reaction stage but there is at least one patroller in neighbourhood who can respond

$\Psi_j^\theta = [\Psi_{j,1}^\theta, \Psi_{j,2}^\theta, \dots, \Psi_{j,\mathcal{N}}^\theta]$  - signaling strategy in case of attack detection

$\Phi_j^\theta = [\Phi_{j,1}^\theta, \Phi_{j,2}^\theta, \dots, \Phi_{j,\mathcal{N}}^\theta]$  - signaling strategy in case of no attack detection


# EASGS operators

- 3 **mutation** types:
  - random allocation/reallocation modification
  - random signaling probability modification
  - random pure strategy improvement
- **Crossover**: combining pure strategies with halved probabilities, averaging signaling probabilities
- **Evaluation** based on game rules (including detection and observational uncertainties)




# Benchmark games


- **342 games** with different graph topologies:
  - sparse (avg deg = 2) – 50 games
  - moderate (avg deg =  $n/2$ ) – 50 games
  - dense (avg deg =  $n-2$ ) – 50 games
  - locally dense (connected cliques) – 192 games
- number of vertices:  $n \in [10, 100]$
- number of patrollers:  $k_s = \sqrt{\frac{n}{2}}$
- number of drones:  $k_d = \frac{2}{3}n - k_s$




sparse




locally dense




moderate



locally dense



dense




locally dense

# Results


EASGS obtained the best result for 200 out of 342 games

	SBP	SBP+W	m-CombSGPO	EASGS
<i>sparse</i>	-86.68 (84%)	<b>-86.01 (92%)</b>	-419.86 (0%)	-91.32 (6%)
<i>moderate</i>	-75.01 (2%)	-72.75 (36%)	-255.73 (0%)	<b>-69.92 (62%)</b>
<i>dense</i>	-58.72 (2%)	-57.98 (34%)	-149.14 (0%)	<b>-51.47 (64%)</b>
<i>locally-dense</i>	-60.68 (4%)	-57.80 (26%)	-340.65 (0%)	<b>-54.36 (70%)</b>

Averaged payoffs for all games



Memory consumption



Thank you

